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Abstract—We formulate notions of opacity for cyber-
physical systems modeled as discrete-time linear time-
invariant systems. A set of secret states is k-ISO with
respect to a set of nonsecret states if, starting from these
sets at time 0, the outputs at time k are indistinguish-
able to an adversarial observer. Necessary and sufficient
conditions to ensure that a secret specification is k-ISO
are established in terms of sets of reachable states. We
also show how to adapt techniques for computing under-
approximations and over-approximations of the set of
reachable states of dynamical systems in order to soundly
approximate k-ISO. Further, we provide a condition for
output controllability, if k-ISO holds, and show that the
converse holds under an additional assumption.
We extend the theory of opacity for single-adversary
systems to the case of multiple adversaries and develop
several notions of decentralized opacity. We study the fol-
lowing scenarios: i) the presence or lack of a centralized
coordinator, and ii) the presence or absence of collusion
among adversaries. In the case of colluding adversaries,
we derive a condition for nonopacity that depends on
the structure of the directed graph representing the
communication between adversaries.
Finally, we relax the condition that the outputs be
indistinguishable and define a notion of ²-opacity, and also
provide an extension to the case of nonlinear systems.
Index Terms—opacity, secret states, nonsecret states, k-
ISO, reachable sets, output controllability, ²−k-ISO
I. INTRODUCTION
Cyberphysical systems (CPSs) are complex systems in
which the functioning of the physical system is gov-
erned by computers that communicate instructions and
operational protocols. This is often carried out over a
network, which may be wired or wireless, indicating that
computational resources and bandwidth could also affect
the operation of the CPS. CPSs are ubiquitous. Examples
include power systems, water distribution networks, and
on a smaller scale, medical devices and home control sys-
tems [3]. While computer-controlled systems allow for the
better integration of sensors, actuators, and algorithms,
the sharing of information among devices and across
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geographies makes the system vulnerable to cyber-attacks.
Such a cyber-attack could be carried out on the physical
system, on the computer(s) controlling the system, or on
the communication links between the system and the com-
puter. Thus, significant material damage can be caused
by an attacker who is able to gain access to the system
remotely, and such attacks will often have the consequence
of causing widespread disruption to everyday life. A recent
example was an attack on the power grid in Ukraine
carried out in December 2015, where attackers remotely
gained access to circuit breakers which brought several
substations offline. They also remotely disabled backup
power supplies, and flooded call centers with fake calls,
to prevent affected customers from reporting complaints.
This left more than 200,000 people without electricity for
several hours. The possible impact of a similar attack on
the United States power grid is examined in [4]. Several
other instances of attacks on CPSs have been documented,
inlcuding in [5], [6]. A compilation of potential challenges
in securing control systems is tabled in [7].
The starting point for any attack is the collection of
information by the attacker from the system that can then
be used by the attacker to compromise the system. One
way of achieving this goal could be for the attacker to focus
on the flow of information from the CPS to itself [8], [9].
Thus, information critical to nominal operation should be
safeguarded in a well designed system. This motivation
has led researchers to develop methods to analyze how
opaque the system behavior is to an adversary. Opacity is a
property that captures whether an intruder, modeled as an
adversarial observer, can infer a ‘secret’ of a system based
on its observation of the system behavior. The current
state of the art in this area studies opacity within the
framework of discrete event systems (DESs) described by
regular languages [10], [11]. Techniques from supervisory
control can be used to enforce opacity on a system [12],
[13]. In other words, a controller can be designed to disable
actions that lead to the leaking of the secret.
Motivation: Although the theory of opacity for DESs
is quite rich, a shortcoming is that it only studies the
case when the states are discrete (like in a DES). In
many practical systems, it is common for the system
variables to take values in a continuous domain. This is
indeed the case in CPSs like power systems and water
distribution networks. This paper considers CPSs modeled
as a discrete-time linear time-invariant (DT-LTI) system
[14] (thus, while time steps are discrete, the state, control,
and output variables are real valued). We use tools from
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2control theory to study opacity for such systems. To the
best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to present a
treatment of opacity for continuous-state systems.
Contributions: We define a notion of opacity at a time
k called k-initial state opacity (k-ISO). A set of secret
states is said to be k-ISO with respect to a set of nonsecret
states if the outputs at time k of every trajectory starting
from the set of secret states cannot be distinguished from
the output at time k of some trajectory starting from the
set of nonsecret states. Necessary and sufficient conditions
to achieve k-ISO are presented in terms of sets of reach-
able states. To overcome the challenge of exactly comput-
ing these reachable sets, we present a characterization
of our notion of opacity in terms of overapproximations
and underapproximations of these sets. Opacity of a given
DT-LTI system is shown to be equivalent to the output
controllability of a system obeying the same dynamics, but
with different initial conditions. Furthermore, we examine
k-ISO under unions and intersections of sets of states.
We extend our treatment to the case of multiple ad-
versarial observers and define several notions of decen-
tralized opacity. These notions of decentralized opacity
will depend on whether there is a centralized coordinator
or not, and the presence or absence of collusion among
the adversaries. We establish conditions for decentralized
opacity in terms of sets of reachable states. In the case of
colluding adversaries, we derive a condition for nonopacity
in terms of the structure of the communication graph.
Finally, we study two extensions: i) we relax the necessity
of indistinguishability of outputs in the definition of k-ISO,
and define a notion of ²-opacity; and ii) we characterize
opacity for discrete-time nonlinear systems.
This paper builds on the preliminary work presented
in [1] and [2] in the following ways: i) we present the
results for the single and multiple adversary cases in
greater detail with complete proofs; ii) new results on
the relationship between k−ISO and approximations of
reachable sets of states are given, as are new results on
k−ISO for nonlinear systems.
A. Related Work
Opacity was first presented as a tool to study crypto-
graphic protocols in [15]. The intruder was modeled as
a passive observer who could read messages exchanged
between two parties, but could not modify, block, or send
a message. The aim of the parties was to exchange secret
information without making it accessible to the intruder.
A theory of supervisory control for DESs represented
by finite state automata (FSA) and regular languages
was formulated in [16], [17]. This framework spawned
research in many areas including fault diagnosis [18],
hybrid systems [19], and robotics [20].
DESs were used to study opacity in [10], which assumed
multiple intruders with different observation capabilities.
Under the assumption that the supervisor could control
all events, it was shown that there exists an optimal
control that enforced opacity. Verification of the opacity
of a secret specified as a language was presented in [12],
[21], while [11], [22], [23] studied the same for secrets
specified as states. Language and state based notions
of opacity were shown to be equivalent in [24], where
algorithms to transform one notion of opacity to the other
were presented. A notion of joint opacity was also proposed
in this paper, in which a system was observed by multiple
adversarial observers who shared their observations with
a coordinator, which then verified opacity.
Opacity was compared with detectability and diagnos-
ability of DESs, and other privacy properties like secrecy
and anonymity in [25]. A subsequent paper [26] defined
opacity for DESs in a decentralized framework with mul-
tiple adversaries, each carrying out its own observation of
the system. The authors of [27] characterized language-
based notions of opacity under unions and intersections.
They demonstrated the existence of supremal and minimal
opaque sublanguages and superlanguages.
Enforcement of opacity using techniques from supervi-
sory control was studied in [12], [13]. The authors of [28]
formulated an alternate method of opacity enforcement
using insertion functions, which are entities that modify
the output behavior of the system in order to keep a secret.
The model-checking and verification of notions of opacity
at run time in online setups was presented in [29]. A
scheme for the verification of opacity in DESs using two-
way observers was proposed in [30]. This enabled a unified
framework to verify multiple notions of opacity.
There is a large body of literature focused on developing
techniques to compute overapproximations and under-
approximations of sets of reachable states. These will
usually depend on how the initial set of states is specified,
including support functions [31], zonotopes [32], and ellip-
soids [33]. A method to compute overapproximations of
reachable sets of states for linear systems with uncertain,
time-varying parameters and inputs was presented in [34].
The reader is referred to [35] for a succinct presentation of
some of the techniques used in computing reachable sets.
B. Outline of Paper
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section II provides an introduction to opacity as studied
for DESs. Section III presents a new formulation of opacity
for DT-LTI systems. In Section IV, we present necessary
and sufficient conditions that would establish our notion
of opacity in terms of reachable sets of states. Section V
studies opacity under unions and intersections. Section
VI uses overapproximations and underapproximations of
the reachable set of states to characterize the notions
of opacity presented in Section III. Opacity is analyzed
in terms of the notion of output controllability in Sec-
tion VII. We then extend our framework to the case of
multiple adversaries in Section VIII, where we present
more than one notion of decentralized opacity. A notion of
opacity where a somewhat strict assumption is relaxed is
presented in Section IX, and an extension to the case of
nonlinear systems is proposed in Section X. We conclude
by presenting future directions of research in Section XI.
3II. OPACITY FOR DISCRETE EVENT SYSTEMS
This section gives a brief introduction to the notions
of opacity studied for discrete event systems. The DES
is typically modeled as a finite state automaton, and
the secret could be specified as a subset of states or a
sublanguage of this automaton.
Let Σ be an alphabet, and let Σ∗ be the set of all
strings of elements from Σ of finite length, including the
empty string ². A language L is a subset of Σ∗. Let
G = (X ,Σ, f , X0) be an finite state automaton, where X is a
nonempty set of states, X0 ⊆ X is a nonempty set of initial
states, and Σ represents the set of events. f : X×Σ→ X is
the (partial) state transition function: given x, y ∈ X and
σ ∈ Σ, f (x,σ) = y if the execution of σ from x takes the
system to y. We write f (x,σ)! if f (x,σ) is a valid transition.
The transition function is extended to f : X×Σ∗→ X in the
usual recursive way:
f (x,²) := x
f (x, se) := f ( f (x, s), e) for s ∈Σ∗, e ∈Σ.
The language generated by G is L (G) := {s ∈ Σ∗ : f (x, s)!},
and describes all possible trajectories of the system.
Let P : Σ∗→ Σ∗ be a projection map. Then, if a string
of events s occurs in the system, an external agent would
see P(s). P can be extended from strings to languages as
follows: for languages L, J ⊆Σ∗, define
P(L)= {t ∈Σ∗ : (∃s ∈ L)t= P(s)}
P−1(J)= {t ∈Σ∗ : P(t) ∈ J}
A secret specification (states, or language) is opaque
with respect to a nonsecret specification if every secret
execution (will be made clear subsequently) is indistin-
guishable from a nonsecret execution. The notion of opac-
ity under consideration will depend on how the secret
(sublanguage, set of initial states, or set of current states)
is specified. Let K1 and K2 be sublanguages of L (G).
Definition 2.1 (Language-based Opacity for DES): K1 is
language based opaque (LBO) with respect to K2 and P if
for every trajectory in K1, there exists a trajectory in K2
that ‘looks’ the same under P, i.e. K1 ⊆ P−1(P(K2)).
Definition 2.2 (Initial State Opacity for DESs): Given G
with Xs, Xns ⊆ X0, and P, Xs is initial state opaque (ISO)
with respect to Xns and P if for every i ∈ Xs and every
t ∈ L(G, i) such that f (i, t) is defined, there exists j ∈ Xns
and t′ ∈ L(G, j) such that f ( j, t′) is defined and P(t)= P(t′).
There are other definitions of opacity that are based on
the current state of the DES, rather than the initial state,
as defined above. These state based and language based
definitions are essentially equivalent, since it has been
shown that there exist polynomial time algorithms that
relate any pair of the notions of opacity [24]. The reader
is referred to [11], [24], [25] for a more detailed exposition
on opacity for discrete event systems.
Example 2.1: [22] Consider the FSA G in Figure 1, with
observable events given by Σo := {a,b}. Assume that Xs =
{x3} and Xns = X \ Xs. Then, Xs is ISO w.r.t. Xns because
for every string s starting from x3, there is another string
Figure 1: Initial State Opacity
²s starting from x1, that looks the same. However, Xs = {x1}
will not be ISO w.r.t. Xns = X \ Xs. In this case, whenever
an intruder sees the string aa, it will be sure that the
system started from Xs (since no other initial state can
generate a string that appears the same as aa).
III. OPACITY FOR LINEAR TIME-INVARIANT SYSTEMS
Although the presentation of opacity for DESs is well-
motivated and elegant, a shortcoming of the framework
is that it only addresses the case when the states of the
system are discrete. The states in CPSs like power systems
and water networks are typically real valued. It is this gap
that we seek to bridge in this paper, by formulating notions
of opacity for continuous state systems. The system is
modeled as a discrete-time linear time-invariant system.
Therefore, while the time steps are discrete, the states,
input, and output variables are real valued.
We define a notion of opacity for such systems, called
k-initial state opacity. We present conditions that will
establish k-ISO of a set of ‘secret’ initial states in terms
of sets of reachable states, and in relation to the notion
of output controllability. Moreover, we will develop a char-
acterization of k-ISO in terms of overapproximations and
underapproximations of the reachable sets of states.
Consider the system:
x(t+1)= Ax(t)+Bu(t)
x(0)= x0 ∈ X0
y(t)=Cx(t) (1)
where x ∈ Rn,u ∈ Rm, y ∈ Rp, and A,B,C are matrices of
appropriate dimensions containing real entries.
Let K be a set of positive integers, corresponding to
instants of time at which the adversary makes an obser-
vation of the system. The subscript s (ns), when appended
to the states, inputs, and outputs, will correspond to tra-
jectories that start from the set of initial secret (nonsecret)
states. The adversary is assumed to have knowledge of the
initial sets of secret and nonsecret states, Xs and Xns,
the system model (A,B), and its own observation map
C. Further, we assume that it has unlimited computing
power, in that it will be able to compute the sets of
reachable states at time k. Its goal is to deduce, on the
basis of observing the system at times k ∈K , whether the
system started from a state in Xs or not.
Definition 3.1 (Strong k−Initial State Opacity): For the
system (1), given Xs, Xns ⊂ X0 and k ∈K , Xs is strongly
k-initial state opaque (k-ISO) with respect to Xns if for
4every xs(0) ∈ Xs and for every sequence of admissible
controls us(0), . . . ,us(k−1), there exist an xns(0) ∈ Xns and
a sequence of admissible controls uns(0), . . . ,uns(k−1) such
that ys(k)= yns(k).
Xs is strongly K -ISO with respect to Xns if Xs is
strongly k-ISO with respect to Xns for all k ∈K .
This means that starting from any secret state and ap-
plying any sequence of k admissible controls (correspond-
ing to the instants the adversary makes an observation),
the system will reach a state whose observation to the
adversary will be indistinguishable from the observation
of a state that can be reached by the application of an
admissible control sequence of length k, starting from
some nonsecret state. Without loss of generality, the sets
Xs and Xns are disjoint. Definition 3.1 is independent of
whether these sets partition the entire state space of the
system. While this notion calls for every state in the set
of initial secret states to be indistinguishable (after some
time k) from some state in the initial set of nonsecret
states, the following definition relaxes this requirement.
Definition 3.2 (Weak k−Initial State Opacity): For the
system (1), given Xs, Xns ⊂ X0 and k ∈K , Xs is weakly
k-ISO with respect to Xns if for some xs(0) ∈ Xs and for
some sequence of admissible controls us(0), . . . ,us(k− 1),
there exist an xns(0) ∈ Xns and a sequence of admissible
controls uns(0), . . . ,uns(k−1) such that ys(k)= yns(k).
Xs is weakly K -ISO with respect to Xns if Xs is weakly
k-ISO with respect to Xns for all k ∈K .
These definitions of opacity for LTI systems is different
from familiar definitions of observability. The observability
problem aims to determine the initial state x(0), given
the entire output and control histories. Here, however,
an adversary aims to determine x(0) via access to only
snapshots of the output and the set of possible controls.
This supports reasoning about adversaries with limited
observational capabilities. It could also be the case that
an adversary might not want to reveal its presence, or not
have the resources to continuously monitor the system.
Our formulation is also different from definitions of
opacity in the DES literature. In those cases, the observa-
tion of the entire secret trajectory must coincide with that
of a nonsecret trajectory. We only need that the secret and
nonsecret outputs at time k coincide. k-ISO also differs
from the notion of k-step opacity proposed in [36]. In their
formulation, k-step opacity is achieved when the adversary
does not know if the system entered a secret state in k
previous steps. We require that the ambiguity exist only
at time k. An additional requirement to our conditions for
k-ISO will also establish k-step opacity.
Finally, k-ISO is also different from the notion of bisim-
ulation relations between dynamical systems [37]. Bisim-
ulation relations typically verify the ‘equality’ of two sys-
tems governed by different dynamics. In our framework,
however, we try to identify equivalence classes of outputs
at time k. Opacity is deemed to have been achieved if the
system starting from two disjoint sets of states at time 0
reaches the same equivalence class of outputs at time k.
Example 3.1: Figure 2 illustrates the problem of a
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Figure 2: ATM Money Transfer
bank needing to transfer money from its office to an
ATM machine. One way for the bank to do this in a
‘secure’ manner would be to equip the truck with the best
defenses that money can buy. However, this might not
be a cost-effective solution, since customizations might be
very expensive, and need to be continuously updated to
stay ahead of potential attackers. An alternative approach
would be for the bank to deploy several identical trucks,
only some of which carry money. This is a reasonable
strategy for the bank to adopt, under the assumption that
the cost of carrying out an attack on a truck is very high.
The motion of a truck can be represented by a system
whose states are the position and velocity of the truck,
and input is the acceleration. Then, assuming unit mass,
and unit sampling interval, the system model is:[
p(k+1)
v(k+1)
]
=
[
1 1
0 1
][
p(k)
v(k)
]
+
[
0.5
1
]
a(k)
y(k)= [1 0][p(k)v(k)
]
The position of the truck at a time k is given by:
p(k)= p(0)+kv(0)+
k−1∑
i=0
(k− i−0.5)a(i)
Let the locations at which money is loaded (denoted
$$$) comprise the set of secret states (Xs), and the initial
locations of the other trucks (denoted X X X ) comprise
the set of nonsecret states (Xns). Then, if an adversary
observes p(k) at some time k, Xs will be k-ISO with
respect to Xns if it cannot determine whether the truck
started from a $$$ location or an X X X location. That is,
for every location (at time 0) at which money was loaded,
there is a corresponding location (at time 0) where there
was no money loaded such that the positions of trucks
which start from these locations are the same at time k.
IV. OPACITY AND REACHABLE SETS OF STATES
The adversary has complete knowledge of the system
model, and the sets of initial secret and nonsecret states.
However, it does not know the exact control sequence
applied in the time interval [0,k]; it only has knowledge
of the sets of allowed inputs that can be applied. In this
light, a possible means of checking that opacity holds is
by relating it to reachability. In this section, we present
5necessary and sufficient conditions to establish k-ISO in
terms of sets of reachable states of the system.
Let Uks := {us(0), . . . ,us(k−1)} be a sequence of k controls
starting from an initial secret state. We analogously define
Ukns := {uns(0), . . . ,uns(k−1)}. Let Xs(k) and Xns(k) denote
the sets of states reachable in k steps, starting at time 0
from nonempty sets Xs and Xns respectively. That is,
Xs(k)=
⋃
x0∈Xs
⋃
Uks
{x : x(i+1)= Ax(i)+Bu(i),∀i < k} (2)
Xns(k)=
⋃
x0∈Xns
⋃
Ukns
{x : x(i+1)= Ax(i)+Bu(i),∀i < k} (3)
The set of outputs at time k can be represented by
CX (k) := {y : y=Cx, x ∈ X (k)} (4)
Theorem 4.1: The following hold:
1) Xs is strongly k-ISO with respect to Xns if and only
if CXs(k)⊆CXns(k).
2) Xs is strongly K -ISO with respect to Xns if and only
if CXs(k)⊆CXns(k) for all k ∈K .
Proof: First, let strong k-ISO hold. Then, for all
xs(0) ∈ Xs, and all {us(·)}k−10 , there exist xns(0) ∈ Xns and
{uns(·)}k−10 such that ys(k)= yns(k). Now, starting from Xs
(respectively Xns), and applying k admissible controls, one
reaches a state in Xs(k) (Xns(k)). Therefore, k-ISO ensures
that for every xs(k) ∈ Xs(k), there exists xns(k) ∈ Xns(k),
such that ys(k)= yns(k). This gives CXs(k)⊆CXns(k).
Next, let CXs(k)⊆CXns(k). This means for every xs(k) ∈
Xs(k), there exists xns(k) ∈ Xns(k), such that ys(k)= yns(k).
Since Xs(k) and Xns(k) are sets of reachable states start-
ing from Xs and Xns respectively, the previous sentence
translates to: for every xs(0) ∈ Xs and every {us(·)}k−10 ,
there exist xns(0) ∈ Xns and {uns(·)}k−10 such that ys(k) =
yns(k). This, by definition, is strong k-ISO.
The second statement of the theorem easily follows by
extending the above argument to all k ∈K .
Remark 4.1: This result can be easily extended to verify
k-step opacity if CXs(k)⊆CXns(k) for all k ∈K := {m,m−
1, . . . ,m−k+1} for any positive integer m> k.
Remark 4.2: Xs(k)⊆ Xns(k) is only a sufficient condition
for Xs to be strongly k-ISO with respect to Xns. To see that
this condition is not necessary, let C = (1 1 1), and Xs(k)=(
1 0 0
)T and Xns(k) = (0 1 0)T . Then, CXs(k) = CXns(k),
establishing k−ISO, even though Xs(k) 6⊆ Xns(k).
A similar results holds for weak k−ISO.
Theorem 4.2: The following hold:
1) Xs is weakly k-ISO with respect to Xns if and only
if CXs(k)∩CXns(k) 6=φ.
2) Xs is weakly K -ISO with respect to Xns if and only
if CXs(k)∩CXns(k) 6=φ for all k ∈K .
Remark 4.3: Xs(k)∩Xns(k) 6= φ is a sufficient condition
for Xs to be weakly k-ISO with respect to Xns.
The next example helps illustrate Theorem 4.1.
Example 4.1: Let Xs, Xns ⊆ X0 with Xs =
{
(
1 0 0
)T ,(0 0 1)T } and Xns = R3 \ Xs. Let A = I3×3,
B = (1 1 1)T and C = (1 1 1). The state and output at time
i for the dynamics in (1) for xs(0)=
(
1 0 0
)T are:
xs(i)=
(
1+∑i−1j=0 us( j) ∑i−1j=0 us( j) ∑i−1j=0 us( j))T
ys(i)= 1+3
i−1∑
j=0
us( j) (5)
xs(0) =
(
0 0 1
)T will also give the same ys(i). Now, let
xns(0) =
(
0 1 0
)T . From (1), the state and output at time
i, with initial state xns(0), are given by:
xns(i)=
(∑i−1
j=0 uns( j) 1+
∑i−1
j=0 uns( j)
∑i−1
j=0 uns( j)
)T
yns(i)= 1+3
i−1∑
j=0
uns( j) (6)
xns(0)=
(
0 1 0
)T will also work for xs(0)= (0 0 1)T .
Comparing equations (5) and (6), Xs will be strongly
k−ISO w.r.t. Xns if for every admissible control sequence
{us(0), . . . ,us(k−1)}, there is an admissible control sequence
{uns(0), . . . ,uns(k−1)} such that:
k−1∑
j=0
us( j)=
k−1∑
j=0
uns( j) (7)
V. k−ISO UNDER SET OPERATIONS
Properties of k−ISO are studied under unions and inter-
sections. The properties verified will be for strong k−ISO,
unless otherwise mentioned. Let X denote the set of initial
states, and X (k) be the set of states reachable in k steps,
starting from X at time 0. Throughout this section, ∧ and
∨ denote the logical AND and OR operations respectively.
We first study the effect of the set union operation on
k-ISO. In order to do this, we first establish basic results
on sets of reachable states and outputs under set union.
Lemma 5.1: Given sets of initial states X1, X2, · · · ⊆ X ,
the reachable set in k steps of their union is equal to the
union of the reachable sets in k steps of each set of initial
states. That is, (
⋃
i X i)(k)=⋃i X i(k).
Proof : x ∈ (⋃
i
X i)(k)
⇔∃x0 ∈ (
⋃
i
X i),∃{u(·)}, (1) holds ∀i < k, x(k)= x
⇔[(∃x0 ∈ X1∧∃{u(·)}) s.t. (x ∈ X1(k))]∨
[(∃x0 ∈ X2∧∃{u(·)}) s.t. (x ∈ X2(k))]∨ . . .
⇔x ∈⋃
i
X i(k) ■
Lemma 5.2: Given X1, X2, · · · ⊆ X and C : Rn → Rm,
C(
⋃
i X i)(k)=⋃i CX i(k).
Proof : y ∈C(⋃
i
X i)(k)
⇔∃x ∈ (⋃
i
X i)(k) such that y=Cx
⇔∃x ∈⋃
i
X i(k) such that y=Cx
⇔(y=Cx∧ x ∈ X1(k))∨ (y=Cx∧ x ∈ X2(k))∨ . . .
⇔(y ∈CX1(k))∨ (y ∈CX2(k))∨ . . .
⇔y ∈⋃
i
CX i(k) ■
6Lemmas 5.1 and 5.2 are used to study k-ISO under set
union, as shown in the following two results.
Theorem 5.1: Xsi is k−ISO with respect to Xns for each
i if and only if
⋃
i Xsi is k−ISO with respect to Xns.
Proof : Xsi k− ISO w.r.t. Xns∀i
⇔CXsi (k)⊆CXns(k)∀i
⇔⋃
i
CXsi (k)⊆CXns(k)
⇔C(⋃
i
Xsi (k))⊆CXns(k)
⇔⋃
i
Xsi is k− ISO w.r.t. Xns ■
Theorem 5.2: Xs is k−ISO w.r.t. Xnsi for each i if and
only if Xs is k−ISO w.r.t. ⋃i Xnsi
Proof : Xs k− ISO w.r.t. Xnsi∀i
⇔CXs(k)⊆CXnsi (k)∀i
⇔CXs(k)⊆
⋃
i
CXnsi (k)
⇔CXs(k)⊆C(
⋃
i
Xnsi (k))
⇔Xs k− ISO w.r.t.
⋃
i
Xnsi ■
We first establish basic results on sets of reachable
states and outputs under set intersection, and use these
to prove our main results on k-ISO under set intersection.
Lemma 5.3: Given sets of initial states X1, X2, · · · ⊆ X ,
the reachable set in k steps of the intersection of the
sets of initial states is contained in the intersection of the
reachable sets in k steps of each set of initial states. That
is, (
⋂
i X i)(k)⊆⋂i X i(k).
Proof : x ∈ (⋂
i
X i)(k)
⇒∃x0 ∈ (
⋂
i
X i),∃{u(·)}, (1) holds ∀i < k, x(k)= x
⇒[(∃x0 ∈ X1∧∃{u(·)}) s.t. (x ∈ X1(k))]∧
[(∃x0 ∈ X2∧∃{u(·)}) s.t. (x ∈ X2(k))]∧ . . .
⇔x ∈⋂
i
X i(k) ■
Lemma 5.4: Given X1, X2, · · · ⊆ X and C : Rn → Rm,
C(
⋂
i X i)(k)⊆⋂i CX i(k).
Proof : y ∈C(⋂
i
X i)(k)
⇔∃x ∈ (⋂
i
X i)(k) such that y=Cx
⇒∃x ∈⋂
i
X i(k) such that y=Cx
⇔(y=Cx∧ x ∈ X1(k))∧ (y=Cx∧ x ∈ X2(k))∧ . . .
⇔(y ∈CX1(k))∧ (y ∈CX2(k))∧ . . .
⇔y ∈⋂
i
CX i(k) ■
Remark 5.1: The reverse inclusions need not hold in
Lemmas 5.3 and 5.4. Let C = I, X1 = Xs and X2 = Xns.
X1∩X2 =;, but X1(k)∩X2(k) need not be empty. 1
Theorem 5.3: If Xsi is k−ISO with respect to Xns for
each i, then
⋂
i Xsi is k−ISO with respect to Xns.
1Recall that the definition of the reachable set in k steps assumes a
nonempty initial set of states.
Proof : Xsi k− ISO w.r.t. Xns∀i
⇔CXsi (k)⊆CXns(k)∀i
⇒⋂
i
CXsi (k)⊆CXns(k)
⇒C(⋂
i
Xsi (k))⊆CXns(k)
⇔⋂
i
Xsi is k− ISO w.r.t. Xns ■
Theorem 5.4: If Xs is k−ISO with respect to Xnsi for
each i, then CXs(k) ⊆ ⋂i CXnsi (k). However, in general,
Xs is not k−ISO with respect to ⋂i Xnsi .
Proof: Xs k− ISO w.r.t. Xnsi∀i
⇔CXs(k)⊆CXnsi (k)∀i
⇒CXs(k)⊆
⋂
i
CXnsi (k)
However, we can have
⋂
i Xnsi = ;, which means
C(
⋂
i Xnsi )(k) is undefined.
A similar result holds for weak opacity.
Theorem 5.5: If Xsi is weakly k−ISO with respect to Xns
for each i, then
⋃
i Xsi is weakly k−ISO w.r.t. Xns.
Proof : Xsi weakly k− ISO w.r.t. Xns∀i
⇔CXsi (k)
⋂
CXns(k) 6= ;∀i
⇒⋃
i
CXsi (k)
⋂
CXns(k) 6= ;
⇒C(⋃
i
Xsi (k))
⋂
CXns(k) 6= ;
⇔⋃
i
Xsi is weakly k− ISO w.r.t. Xns ■
Remark 5.2: If Xsi is weakly k−ISO with respect to Xns
for each i, then
⋂
i Xsi need not be weakly k−ISO with
respect to Xns. That is, given CXsi (k)
⋂
CXnsi (k) 6= ;∀i, if⋂
i Xsi =;, then C(
⋂
i Xsi )(k)
⋂
CXns(k) will not be defined.
VI. OPACITY AND REACH-SET APPROXIMATIONS
A. Determining Reachable Sets of States
The notions of opacity developed in this paper all rely
on computing a reachable set of states at a time k. Exactly
computing these sets for dynamical systems whose states
take continuous values is usually impossible.
A missing link in the works on computing approxima-
tions of reachable sets is that they do not study the effect
of set operations (eg. intersection, subset containment)
over these approximations on properties that rely on
carrying out the same operations on the exact reachable
sets. The notion of k-ISO proposed in this paper is an
example of such a property (as shown in Theorem 4.1).
For systems of the form in Equation (1), a major obstacle
in exactly computing reachable sets of states is that of
decidability [38]. Here, decidability refers to the existence
of an efficient method to determine whether or not a given
state, or a set of states, is reachable from a given set of
states. The reachability problem was shown to be decid-
able for the special case of linear systems in which the
A matrix had a particular eigenstructure (constant and
nilpotent, or diagonalizable with purely imaginary or ra-
tional real eigenvalues) in [38]. However, the reachability
problem for dynamical systems, in general, is undecidable.
7One means of exactly determining the set of reachable
states at a time k is from the Minkowski sum 2 of the
reachable states at time k−1 and the set of states at time
k (obtained from the system dynamics). However, the size
of the representation grows at each step, and the problem
becomes intractable for large time horizons. This calls for
the need to develop efficient algorithms that can compute
‘good’ approximations of these reachable sets of states.
There is a large body of work ([31], [32], [33]) that has
focused on this problem, and several techniques have been
proposed to compute approximations of reachable states.
The choice of technique is usually governed by how the
initial set of states and inputs is specified.
Furthermore, the approximations are tight in the sense
that the approximate reachable set will touch the original
reachable set at the points where inequalities defining the
approximate sets (in terms of half-spaces or ellipsoids)
attain equality. The reader is directed to Tables I and II in
[39] for a discussion on the merits of some of the methods
to determine these sets.
B. k-ISO and Reach-set Approximations
We now characterize k-ISO in terms of over- and under-
approximations of sets of reachable sets at the time k.
Definition 6.1: Given a set S, S is an overapproximation
of S if S ⊆ S. S is an underapproximation of S if S ⊆ S.
S is then the union over all its underapproximations,
S, and the intersection over all its overapproximations, S.
We further make the following assumption.
Assumption 6.1: Overapproximations and underapprox-
imations of the reachable sets of states at time k, starting
from Xs and Xns at time 0 have already been computed.
Let X s(k) and X s(k) denote the overapproximation and
underapproximation of the reachable set Xs(k). Similarly,
let X ns(k) and X ns(k) denote the overapproximation and
underapproximation of the reachable set Xns(k).
Lemma 6.1: The following hold:
1) X s(k)⊆ Xs(k)⊆ X s(k);
2) X ns(k)⊆ Xns(k)⊆ X ns(k);
3) CX s(k)⊆CXs(k)⊆CX s(k);
4) CX ns(k)⊆CXns(k)⊆CX ns(k).
Proof: The first two parts of the Lemma follow from
the fact that the set X is an underapproximation of X ,
and X is overapproximated by X .
The third and fourth parts can be concluded from a
similar argument for the set CX .
Lemma 6.1 leads to a condition on the approximation
of the reachable sets of states at time k, starting from Xs
and Xns, if Xs is k-ISO with respect to Xns.
Proposition 6.1: If Xs is k-ISO with respect to Xns, then
CX s(k)⊆CX ns(k).
Proof: If k-ISO holds, then from Theorem 4.1) we have
that CXs(k)⊆CXns(k). From parts 3) and 4) of Lemma 6.1,
we have that CX s(k)⊆CXs(k)⊆CXns(k)⊆CX ns(k).
Parts 3) and 4) of Lemma 6.1, and Proposition 6.1 are
illustrated in Figure 3.
2The Minkowski sum of sets S1,S2 ⊆ Rd is S1 ⊕S2 = {s1 + s2 : s1 ∈
S1, s2 ∈ S2}.
Figure 3: Representations of tight overapproximations and
underapproximations of reachable sets for k-ISO. The
figure illustrates Theorem 4.1, parts 3) and 4) of Lemma
6.1, and Proposition 6.1. However, Proposition 6.2 does not
hold for this representation.
The next result is a converse of the previous argument,
in that it presents a condition on the approximations of the
reachable sets of states at time k which will ensure that
k-ISO holds. As one might conjecture, this condition will
have to be somewhat stronger than the condition on the
approximate reachable sets of states in Proposition 6.1.
Proposition 6.2: If CX s(k)⊆ CX ns(k), then Xs is k-ISO
with respect to Xns.
Proof: We have from Lemma 6.1 that CXs(k) ⊆
CX s(k) ⊆ CX ns(k) ⊆ CXns(k), which gives us CXs(k) ⊆
CXns(k). From Theorem 4.1, this is necessary and suf-
ficient for Xs to be k-ISO with respect to Xns.
Remark 6.1: At this point, it is important to realize the
need to work with both over- and under-approximations
of the reachable sets of states. The condition CX s(k) ⊆
CX ns(k) does not reveal any useful information on
whether CXs(k)⊆CXns(k), since this will depend on how
tight the overapproximations are. This, however might not
be enough to conclude whether Xs is k-ISO w.r.t. Xns by
using only the overapproximations of the sets of reachable
states at time k, starting from Xs and Xns.
We now present a result on the computational complex-
ity of verifying k−ISO in terms of the approximations of
the reachable set of states. Assume that Lover and Lunder,
respectively, denote the number of overapproximations
and underapproximations of Xs(k) and Xns(k).
Proposition 6.3: Let L := Lover +Lunder. Then, the com-
putational complexity of verifying that Xs is k−ISO with
respect to Xns is c1kLn3+c2 pn+c3, for constants c1, c2, c3.
Proof: The term c1kLn3 is an upper bound on com-
puting the reachable sets at time k. These will depend
on the complexity of computing Ak, which is polynomial
in the dimension of the state space, n, and is typically
of the order of n3. This is done a total of L times for
time k. The second term is the computational complexity
of the matrix-vector multiplication Cx, where C ∈ Rp×n
and x ∈ Rn. This term does not depend on L since we
8assume that this operation is performed on the union of
the underapproximations, and intersection of the overap-
proximations, which we assume to take a constant amount
of time. The third term represents other constant factors
that result from performing these operations.
Remark 6.2: In Proposition 6.3, we refrain from using
the more standard notation, O(·), for computational com-
plexity, since k,L,n may not be of comparable magnitudes.
The next result presents a necessary and sufficient
condition for Xs to be k-ISO with respect to Xns in terms
of the exact computations of the reachable sets of states
at time k, starting from Xs and Xns.
Before presenting the result, we require some defini-
tions. From Equation (1), observe that C : Rn → Rp is a
linear map from the set of states to the set of outputs.
Definition 6.2: The inverse image of C with respect to a
set Y ⊆Rp, denoted C−1, is:
C−1Y := {x|x ∈Rn,Cx ∈Y }
Definition 6.3: Consider a reachable set of states at time
k, denoted X (k). Then, the backward reachable set at time
0 starting from X (k), denoted Pre0(X (k)), is the set of
states at time 0 from which one can reach a state in X (k)
at time k by applying a set of k control inputs:
Pre0(X (k)) :={x ∈ X0|∃u(0), . . . ,u(k−1) s.t. x(i+1)= Ax(i)
+Bu(i), i = 0, . . . ,k−1; x(0)= x; x(k) ∈ X (k)}
The next result characterizes k-ISO in terms of the
inverse image of C, and the backward reachable set at
time 0, starting from reachable sets of states at time k.
Theorem 6.1: Xs is k-ISO with respect to Xns if and only
if the following two conditions are satisfied:
1) (Pre0[C−1(CXs(k))])∩Xns 6= ;;
2) Xs ⊂ Pre0[C−1(CXns(k))].
Proof: First, assume that Conditions 1) and 2) of
Theorem 6.1 hold. Note that the result of C−1(CXs(k))
is a subset of Rn given by Xs(k)∪ Z(k), where Z(k) :=
{z|z ∉ Xs(k),Cz ∈ CXs(k)}. Let X ′(k) := Xs(k)∪Z(k). Then,
Pre0[X ′(k)] will give the set of states at time 0 from
which X ′(k) can be reached at time k. Condition 1) being
satisfied means that there exists a nonsecret initial state
in Xns from which by applying some set of k control inputs,
we can reach a state at time k such that Cx ∈ CXs(k).
Additionally, if Condition 2) is also satisfied, then for every
initial secret state, and for every set of k control inputs
starting from Xs, there is a nonsecret initial state and
a set of k controls such that the outputs at time k are
indistinguishable. This, by Definition 3.1, is k-ISO.
Now, assume that Xs is k-ISO with respect to Xns. Then,
from Theorem 4.1, we have CXs(k)⊆CXns(k). Therefore,
there exists a state in Xns from which we can reach a
state in Xns(k) by applying k control inputs, such that
Cx ∈ CXs(k) for some x ∈ Xns(k). This is condition 1).
Condition 2) follows from the fact that for every state in
Xs, by applying any set of k controls, it must be the case
that Cx ∈CXns(k), where x ∈ Xs(k).
Although Theorem 6.1 presents conditions to establish
k-ISO in terms of the exact computations of the reachable
sets of states, overapproximations and underapproxima-
tions of these sets can be used as a means to enforce opac-
ity on a secret specification that is not k-ISO w.r.t. a given
nonsecret specification. This can be achieved by ‘pruning’
the initial secret specification to remove states that might
be ‘vulnerable’ to revealing the secret (and hence will not
be opaque), in order to get a new specification of the secret
(which will be a subset of the original specification) that
will be k-ISO with respect to the nonsecret specification,
Xns. As an example, assume that CXs(k) 6⊂ CXns(k), but
CXs(k)∩CXns(k) 6= ;. This means that there exist initial
secret states in Xs and/ or controls starting from these
states that will reveal the secret at time k.
We now present a way to prune the initial secret spec-
ification that will ensure opacity of a secret specification
that will be a subset of the original specification.
Proposition 6.4: Let CXs(k) 6⊂ CXns(k), and CXs(k)∩
CXns(k) 6= ;. Define a new secret specification to be
X ′s := Xs∩Pre0[CXs(k)∩CXns(k)]. Then X ′s will be k-ISO
with respect to Xns.
Proof: Notice that Pre0[CXs(k)∩CXns(k)] eliminates
those initial states from which a state x can be reached at
time k such that Cx ∈ (CXs(k)\ CXns(k)). The new secret
specification is obtained by considering only those states
in Xs that will lead to a state x such that Cx ∈ CXns(k)
(thus satisfying Condition 2 of Theorem 6.1).
A good candidate initial secret set of states will not
require too much ‘pruning’ in order to ensure that it
is k-ISO w.r.t. a nonsecret set of initial states. That
is, this set will not contain states that are vulnerable
to being revealed to an adversary. A set Xs will be a
good candidate initial secret set if CX s(k)⊆CX ns(k) and
CX s(k)∩CX ns(k) 6= ;. The best candidate initial secret set
will require no pruning in order to ensure opacity. Xs will
be the best candidate initial secret set if CX s(k)⊆CX ns(k).
Remark 6.3: A good (respectively, the best) candidate set
mentioned above is ‘good’ (the ‘best’) in the literal sense
of the meaning of the word; we are yet to formulate a
mathematically precise notion of this set.
VII. OPACITY AND OUTPUT CONTROLLABILITY
A state of the system is said to be controllable if we can
find an input that transfers the state to the origin in finite
time. While there are several interesting results in the
literature that relate controllability of a dynamical system
to other properties of interest, the notion of output control-
lability has been largely overlooked. Output controllability
is the ability to transfer the state of the system such that
the output corresponding to the state at some finite time
is zero. It is easy to see that while controllability im-
plies output controllability, the reverse argument need not
necessarily hold. This section establishes an equivalence
between k-ISO and output controllability.
Definition 7.1: A state x of (1) is controllable on [0,k f ]
if there exists a control sequence {u(·)} that transfers the
state of the system from x(0)= x to x(k f )= 0.
9The output of (1) at time k is given by:
y(k)=CAkx(0)+
k−1∑
j=0
CAk− j−1Bu( j)
Definition 7.2: A state x of (1) is output controllable on
[0,k f ] if there exists a control sequence {u(·)} that trans-
fers the system from x(0)= x to x(k f ), so that y(k f )= 0.
The main result of this section indicates that Xs being
k-ISO with respect to Xns ensures that there exists a
state that is output controllable. We then prove that the
converse holds, under an additional assumption.
Theorem 7.1: Let Xs be k−ISO with respect to Xns.
Then, there exists a state of (1) that is output con-
trollable on [0,k]. Further, if k−ISO is established for
the pair (xs(0), xns(0)) ∈ Xs×Xns (and appropriate control
sequences {us(·)} and {uns(·)}), then the control sequence
u(i) = us(i)− uns(i), i = 0,1, . . . ,k− 1, will achieve output
controllability for the initial state x(0)= xs(0)− xns(0).
Proof: k−ISO implies ys(k) = yns(k) for appropriate
xs(0), {us(·)}, xns(0) and {uns(·)}. Setting x(0)= xs(0)− xns(0)
and u(i)= us(i)−uns(i), i = 0,1, . . . ,k−1 in the dynamics of
(1) ensures y(k)= 0, thus achieving output controllability
of the state x(0)= xs(0)− xns(0).
Theorem 7.2: Let (1) be output controllable in k steps
for a set of states Xoc(0) \ {0} and controls {U(·)}. Let X1
and X2 be sets such that every x1 ∈ X1 can be written
as x+ x2, where x ∈ Xoc(0) \ {0} and x2 ∈ X2. Then, X1 is
strongly k−ISO with respect to X2.
Proof: Output controllability ensures that:
y(k)=CAkx(0)+
k−1∑
j=0
CAk− j−1BU( j)= 0 (8)
For any control sequence {u1(·)}, the output at time k,
starting from any x1(0) ∈ X1 is:
y1(k)=CAkx1(0)+
k−1∑
j=0
CAk− j−1Bu1( j)
The output at time k starting from x2(0) ∈ X2 with the
control sequence {u1(·)−U(·)} is:
y2(k)=CAkx2(0)+
k−1∑
j=0
CAk− j−1B[u1( j)−U( j)]
Every x1 ∈ X1 can be written as x+x2, where x ∈ Xoc(0)\{0},
x2 ∈ X2. This and Equation (8) gives y1(k)= y2(k).
Thus, for any x1 ∈ X1 and any control sequence starting
from x1, there exist x2 ∈ X2 and another control sequence
such that the outputs after k steps are the same. This is
strong k−ISO with Xs = X1 and Xns = X2.
VIII. DECENTRALIZED OPACITY
In this section, we define several notions of decentral-
ized opacity in the presence of multiple adversaries. The
presence or absence of collusion among the adversaries,
and the presence or absence of a coordinator that aggre-
gates information based on the adversaries’ observations,
is the distinguishing feature, and a definition of decen-
tralized opacity is proposed in each case. As in the single
adversary case, every adversary is assumed to have knowl-
edge of the initial sets of secret and nonsecret states, Xs
and Xns, the system model (A,B), and its own observation
map Ci, and is assumed to have unlimited computing
power. The system model is described in Equation (9):
x(t+1)= Ax(t)+Bu(t)
x(0)= x0 ∈ X0
yi(t)=Cix(t); i = 1,2, . . . , l (9)
where x ∈ Rn,u ∈ Rm, yi ∈ Rpi , and A,B,Ci are matrices
of appropriate dimensions containing real entries. In the
sequel, we will assume that all of the adversaries observe
the system at the same time instants in the set K .
Remark 8.1: The scenarios that we study when there
is more than one adversary are not enforced on the
adversaries. Instead, we seek to account for the different
ways in which these adversaries could act. This is a subtle,
yet important distinction. The definition of decentralized
opacity which will apply will be according to the distin-
guishing feature described at the start of this section.
A. No Coordinator, No Collusion
The agents are assumed to not communicate with each
other, and there is no centralized coordinator. Opacity
of the secret will be achieved when it is simultaneously
opaque with respect to every adversary.
Definition 8.1: For system (9), given Xs, Xns ⊆ X0 and k ∈
K , Xs is strongly decentralized k−ISO with respect to Xns
if for all xs(0) ∈ Xs and for every sequence of admissible
controls us(0), . . . ,us(k−1), there exist an xns(0) ∈ Xns, and
a sequence of admissible controls uns(0), . . . ,uns(k−1) such
that ys i(k)= yns i(k) for all i ∈ {1,2, . . . , l}.
Xs is strongly decentralized K −ISO with respect to Xns
if it is strongly decentralized k−ISO for all k ∈K .
As in the single adversary case, we have a necessary and
sufficient condition for decentralized opacity in terms of
sets of reachable states in k steps.
Theorem 8.1: The following hold:
1) Xs is strongly decentralized k−ISO w.r.t. Xns if and
only if Ci Xs(k)⊆Ci Xns(k) for all i ∈ {1,2, . . . , l}.
2) Xs is strongly decentralized K −ISO w.r.t. Xns if and
only if Ci Xs(k)⊆Ci Xns(k) for all k ∈K , and for all
i ∈ {1,2, . . . , l}.
Proof: The proof follows from Theorem 4.1.
The following result explores the relationship between
decentralized k−ISO for a set of adversaries and k−ISO for
a single adversary with an aggregated observation map.
Proposition 8.1: Xs is strongly decentralized k−ISO with
respect to Xns and adversaries with observation maps
C1, . . . ,Cl if Xs is strongly k−ISO with respect to Xns for
the single adversary with the aggregated observation map
C¯ := (CT1 CT2 . . . CTl )T .
Proof: Xs strongly k−ISO with respect to Xns is
equivalent to C¯Xs(k)⊆ C¯Xns(k). This means that for every
xs(k) ∈ Xs(k), there exists an xns(k) ∈ Xns(k) such that
C1xs(k)= C1xns(k), . . . , Cl xs(k)= Cl xns(k). Thus, we have
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Ci Xs(k)⊆Ci Xns(k) for all i ∈ {1, . . . , l}, which is equivalent
to Xs being strongly decentralized k−ISO w.r.t. Xns.
It is to be noted that strong decentralized k−ISO need
not necessarily ensure strong k−ISO with respect to an
adversary with the aggregated observation map since, the
nonsecret states in Xns(k) and the corresponding control
sequence for each adversary may be different.
B. With Coordinator, No Collusion
Here, we assume that there is a coordinator, whose
role is to poll the observations of each adversary, and
decide on co-opacity according to some (predefined) rule.
The coordinator does not have knowledge of the system
model or the adversaries’ observation maps. In fact, our
model is such that the coordinator cannot do any better
even if it knows the system model or the observation maps.
It can be viewed as an agent whose role is to ensure that
the whole is greater than the sum of its parts.
Formally, the coordinator communicates to the adver-
saries the time instants K , at which the system needs
to be observed. At each k ∈K , agent i observes yi(k) =
Cix(k). The agents communicate φi(yi(k)) to the coordina-
tor, where φi :Rpi → 2Rn×Rn is defined as:
φi(yi(k)) := {(x1, x2) ∈ Xs(k)×Xns(k) : Cix1 =Cix2 = yi(k)}
Thus, φi(·) returns secret-nonsecret state pairs that give
the same output yi(k) at time k.
The coordinator then computes a function Ψ(k) :=
Ψ(φ1(y1(k)), . . . ,φl(yl(k))), where Ψ : (2R
n×Rn )l → 2Rn×Rn .
Thus, the coordinator plays the role of gathering the out-
puts of the observations of each adversary, and composing
them to then decide on opacity. An example of a valid
coordinator function is Ψ(k)=⋃i(φi(Cix(k))).
The scheme is shown in Figure 4 for four adversaries.
Definition 8.2: For system (9), given Xs, Xns ⊆ X0 and
k ∈K , Xs is strongly co-k−ISO with respect to Xns and
Ψ if for all xs(0) ∈ Xs and for every sequence of admissible
controls us(0), . . . ,us(k−1), there exist an xns(0) ∈ Xns, and
a sequence of admissible controls uns(0), . . . ,uns(k−1) such
that Ψ(k) is nonempty.
Xs is strongly co-K −ISO with respect to Xns and Ψ if
it is strongly co-k−ISO for all k ∈K .
Before presenting the main result of this section, we
provide an alternative characterization of strong k−ISO in
terms of the map φ (the subscript on φi is dropped since
we consider only a single adversary in this case). Further,
it is important to note that the functions φi and Ψ return
a set of pairs of states at time k. This information needs
to be used to determine opacity of the initial set of secret
states with respect to the initial set of nonsecret states.
We extend the definition of φ to sets of outputs at time
k. Let φ(CX (k)) :=⋃{φ(y(k)) : [y(k)=Cx(k)]∧ [x(k) ∈ X (k)]}.
For (x1i , x
2
j ) ∈ Xs(k)×Xns(k), in a slight abuse of notation,
we treat each x1i and x
2
j as a set. This will allow us to
define
⋃
i, j(x1i , x
2
j ) := (
⋃
i x1i ,
⋃
j x2j ), where
⋃
i x1i ⊆ Xs(k), and⋃
j x2j ⊆ Xns(k).
Proposition 8.2: Xs is strongly k−ISO with respect
to Xns if and only if φ(CXs(k)) = (Xs(k), X ′ns(k)), where
X ′ns(k) := {x ∈ Xns(k) : Cx ∈CXs(k)}.
Proof: Let strong k−ISO hold. Then, CXs(k) ⊆
CXns(k) (Theorem 4.1), and φ(CXs(k)) = (Xs(k), X ′ns(k)),
where X ′ns(k) is as defined above.
If φ(CXs(k)) = (Xs(k), X ′ns(k)), then ∀x1 ∈ Xs(k), ∃x2 ∈
X ′ns(k) ⊆ Xns(k) such that Cx1(k) = Cx2(k). This gives
CXs(k)⊆CXns(k), and hence strong k−ISO.
The above result says that strong k−ISO holds if and
only if the first component of φ(·) when acting on the set
of secret outputs at time k is the entire set of reachable
states at time k, starting from Xs. Further, it also deter-
mines the states in Xns(k) that ensure strong k−ISO.
Theorem 8.2: Xs is strongly co-k−ISO with respect to
Xns and Ψ if and only if Ψ(φ1(C1Xs(k)), . . . ,φl(Cl Xs(k)))=
(Xs(k), X ′ns(k)), where X ′ns(k)⊆ Xns(k).
Proof: The proof follows from the previous result, and
the definition of co−k−ISO. The major difference is that
in this case, the first component of φi(Ci Xs(k)) can be a
subset of Xs(k). However, the coordinator function Ψ must
be such that its first component is Xs(k).
Thus, Xs can be strongly co−k−ISO w.r.t. Xns though
strong k−ISO might not hold for any single adversary.
C. No Coordinator, With Collusion
In this case, there is no coordinator, but the adversaries
are assumed to communicate among themselves. This is
a new approach, and has not been studied for DESs.
The communication structure is represented by a directed
graph G , whose vertices are the adversaries, and G has
an edge directed from i to j if adversary j can receive
information from adversary i. j is then called a neighbor
of i. The goal of the adversaries is to ensure, using the
coordination structure, that Xs is not k−ISO with respect
to Xns for each of them. To this end, we introduce the
following definitions:
Definition 8.3: For the system (9), given Xs, Xns ⊆ X0
and k ∈K , Xs is strongly not k−ISO with respect to Xns
if Xs is not strongly k−ISO w.r.t. Xns for every adversary.
Definition 8.4: Given a graph G = (V ,E ), with vertices
V and edges E ⊂ V ×V , D ⊂ V is a dominating set if every
vertex not in D has a neighbor in D.
Given a directed graph G = (V ,E ), D ⊂ V is a directed
dominating set(red vertices in Figure 5) if every vertex not
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Figure 5: Vertices in red form a directed dominating set
in D has an incoming edge from some vertex in D, that
is, [∀u ∈ V \ D, ∃v ∈D such that (v→ u) ∈ E ].
At each k ∈ K , each adversary observes y(k), deter-
mines if k−ISO holds or not, and communicates (Ci,<
k−ISO status>i) to its neighbors in G . If < k−ISO
status>i= 0, i.e. k−ISO does not hold for adversary i, then
a neighbor j of i in G adopts Ci as its observation map
if < k−ISO status> j 6= 0. This scheme can be interpreted
as a dynamic version of k−ISO, in which the adversaries
change their observation maps at times k ∈K depending
on the k−ISO status of their neighbors in G .
Assumption 8.1: The time required for the adversaries
to communicate amongst themselves is much less than the
time scale of the system.
We present a sufficient condition to achieve strong non-
opacity without requiring non-opacity w.r.t. every adver-
sary using the communication scheme described above.
Theorem 8.3: For the system (9), Xs is strongly not
k−ISO with respect to Xns if the set of adversaries for
which Xs is not strongly k−ISO with respect to Xns is a
directed dominating set of G .
Proof: Each adversary communicates (Ci,< k−ISO
status>i) to its neighbors in G . Thus, if k−ISO does not
hold for some adversary i, then its neighbors will also
adopt the same Ci matrix at time k. The result follows
from the definition of a directed dominating set.
IX. ²-OPACITY
The condition that the output at times k starting from
every state in Xs be equal to that got by starting from a
state in Xns is quite strong. In this section, we postulate
that (a form of) opacity (for the single adversary case) will
still hold if the outputs differ by an arbitrary amount.
Definition 9.1: For system (1), given Xs, Xns ⊆ X0, k ∈K ,
and ² ≥ 0, Xs is strongly ²− k−ISO with respect to Xns
if for all xs(0) ∈ Xs and for every sequence of admissible
controls us(0), . . . ,us(k−1), there exist an xns(0) ∈ Xns, and
a sequence of admissible controls uns(0), . . . ,uns(k−1) such
that ‖ys(k)− yns(k)‖2 ≤ ².
Xs is strongly ²−K −ISO with respect to Xns if it is
strongly ²−k−ISO for all k ∈K .
Let z be a point, and S be a set. Then, the distance of
z from S is defined as dist(z,S) := inf {dist(z, s)|s ∈ S}.
Theorem 9.1: The following hold:
1) Xs is strongly ²−k−ISO w.r.t. Xns if and only if :
max
z∈CXs(k)
dist(z,CXns(k))≤ ² (10)
Figure 6: Representation of ²−k−ISO
That is, the farthest a point in CXs(k) can be from
CXns(k) is ². This is shown in Figure 6.
2) Xs is strongly ²−K −ISO with respect to Xns if and
only if (10) holds for all k ∈K .
Proof: The proof of this result follows from the defi-
nition of ²−k-ISO and Theorem 4.1.
Notice that ² = 0 in Theorem 6 corresponds to the
definition of strong k-ISO. This notion of ²− k-ISO can
be used to quantify how opaque a secret specification
is. Differential privacy was proposed in [40], [41] to pro-
vide probabilistic guarantees on the indistinguishability
of datasets. It remains to be seen if a connection can be
made between this and ²−k-ISO. An important distinction
between the frameworks is that ours is deterministic,
while that considered in differential privacy is stochastic.
X. OPACITY FOR NONLINEAR SYSTEMS
Thus far, we have analyzed opacity in the context of
linear systems. In this section, we extend the analysis to
discrete-time nonlinear systems (DTNLSs), and formulate
a notion of opacity for such systems. Consider the DTNLS:
x(t+1)= f (x(t),u(t))
x(0)= x0 ∈ X0
y(t)= h(x(t)) (11)
where x ∈ Rn,u ∈ Rm, y ∈ Rp, and f (·, ·) and h(·) are suffi-
ciently smooth functions with h(0n)= 0p, where 0∗ is the
1×∗ vector of zeroes.
Before studying opacity for systems of this kind, we
take a brief detour to make note of some of the relevant
literature. In a series of papers, the authors of [42], [43],
and [44] derived conditions under which a DTNLS could be
equivalently represented as a discrete-time linear system.
A geometric analysis of controllability of DTNLSs in terms
of Lie algebras of vector fields was presented in [45]. A
linear algebraic framework for the analysis of synthesis
problems in DTNLSs was proposed in [46], where the
notion of the rank of an analytic discrete-time system
was developed. In a more recent work, the authors of
[47] studied input-to-state stability properties of DTNLSs,
using well established notions of input-to-state stability
from the continuous time version.
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Remark 10.1: [46] The analysis of continuous time non-
linear systems is largely focused on systems that are affine
in the input (that is, of the form x˙(t)= f (x(t))+ g(x(t))u(t)).
The advantages that such a model offers is twofold: i)
the derivatives of the output depend polynomially on the
inputs and their derivatives, and ii) the vector fields
involved have a nice structure (a drift term and m control
vector fields). Moreover, this class of systems is general
enough to model many practical nonlinear systems. How-
ever, the class of discrete-time nonlinear systems can also
potentially include versions of continuous time systems
that are sampled in time, which necessitates considering
the more general form of the DTNLS in Equation (11).
In this section, we extend our formulation of k-ISO for
DT-LTI systems to DTNLSs. The assumptions are similar
to those in Section III. We have the following definition:
Definition 10.1: For the system (11), given Xs, Xns ⊂ X0
and k ∈K , Xs is strongly k-initial state opaque (k-ISO)
with respect to Xns if for every xs(0) ∈ Xs and for every
sequence of admissible controls us(0), . . . ,us(k− 1), there
exist an xns(0) ∈ Xns and a sequence of admissible controls
uns(0), . . . ,uns(k−1) such that ys(k)= yns(k).
Xs is strongly K -ISO with respect to Xns if Xs is
strongly k-ISO with respect to Xns for all k ∈K .
This definition of k-ISO is weaker than the notion of
indistinguishability in the nonlinear control literature (see
for example, [48]), where two states are said to be indis-
tinguishable if the outputs are identical at each instant of
time for every admissible control sequence.
In this case also, since only the set of possible inputs
that can be applied at each time step in [0,k] is available,
we can establish conditions for k-ISO in terms of sets
of reachable states. Let Uks := {us(0), . . . ,us(k − 1)} and
Ukns := {uns(0), . . . ,uns(k−1)}. Let Xs(k) and Xns(k) denote
the sets of states reachable in k steps, starting at time 0
from nonempty sets Xs and Xns respectively. That is,
Xs(k)=
⋃
x0∈Xs
⋃
Uks
{x : x(i+1)= f (x(i),u(i)),∀i < k} (12)
Xns(k)=
⋃
x0∈Xns
⋃
Ukns
{x : x(i+1)= f (x(i),u(i)),∀i < k} (13)
The set of outputs at time k can be represented by
h(X (k)) := {y : y= h(x), x ∈ X (k)} (14)
We have the following result:
Theorem 10.1: For the system (11), Xs is strongly k-ISO
with respect to Xns if and only if h(Xs(k))⊆ h(Xns(k)).
Proof: The proof of this result can be developed simi-
lar to that of Theorem 4.1, and is omitted for brevity.
We have shown that there is a connection between k-
ISO and output controllability for LTI systems in Section
VII. To the best of our knowledge, there does not exist a
notion of output controllability for DTNLSs of the form in
Equation (11). It will be interesting to develop a frame-
work that would relate k-ISO for nonlinear systems to
(nonlinear) output controllability.
XI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a framework for opac-
ity for dynamical systems in which the state and input
variables take continuous values. Prior work in this field
studied opacity only for discrete event systems, in which
states were discrete. We first presented a notion of opacity
for single-adversary discrete-time, linear, time-invariant
systems called k-initial state opacity. Necessary and suf-
ficient conditions to establish k-ISO were presented in
terms of sets of reachable states. Realizing that exact com-
putation of these reachable sets is difficult, we presented
a characterization of k-ISO using overapproximations and
underapproximations of these sets. Further, we showed
that opacity of a given DT-LTI system was equivalent to
the output controllability of a system obeying the same
dynamics, but with a different initial condition.
We then proposed an extension to multiple-adversary
systems, where we formulated more than one notion of
decentralized opacity. These notions depended on whether
there was a centralized coordinator or not, and the pres-
ence or absence of collusion among the adversaries. We
established conditions for decentralized opacity in terms
of reachable sets of states. In the case of colluding adver-
saries, we derived a condition for nonopacity in terms of
the structure of the communication graph.
Finally, we formulated notions of opacity for discrete-
time nonlinear systems, and for the case when the as-
sumptions on secret and nonsecret outputs being exactly
equal was relaxed, called ²−k-ISO.
The results in this paper have been qualitative in
nature. Future work will pursue means of quantifying
opacity. A first step in this direction would be to inves-
tigate if there is a connection between the notion of ²−k-
ISO and differential privacy. We could leverage the results
on k-ISO under unions and intersections in Section V to
quantify how opaque the secret is when one only has an
arbitrary, finite number of overapproximations and under-
approximations of the reachable sets of states. A third
interesting scenario to consider is when the adversary
might incur a cost in making an observation, and has to
decide on opacity by incurring as low a cost as possible.
The results in this paper, together with our work on
opacity for switched linear systems in [49], provide a
complete framework for opacity for continuous-state dy-
namical systems. Although our results have been for the
discrete-time case, many of them will hold for continuous-
time systems as well. This work complements the large
body of literature on opacity for discrete event systems.
It is our belief that the two frameworks can be used in
conjunction to analyze opacity for more general CPSs.
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